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304 DIS~RICT BOND CO. V. POLLACK. [19 C. (2d) 
the original title is, of course, sufficient, and apparently the 
phrase "relating to civil liability and financial responsibility 
of owners and operators of vehicles" in the title to the amend-
ment refers only to the added sections, and not to the amended 
sections. [3] An amending title. is sufficient if it. reads: 
, 'An act to amend" a certain section of the code or a statute. 
(Estate of Elliott, 165 Cal. 339 [132 Pac. 439] ; Beach v. Von 
Detten, 139 Cal. 462 [73 Pac. 187] ; People v. Parvin, 74 Cal. 
549 [16 Pac. 490.) [2b] Even assuming that the additional 
words relate to section 402, we are satisfied that the phrase 
, 'financial responsibility of owners" is sufficiently broad in 
meaning to include damage to a person's own property. 
The addition of further descriptive words cannot vitiate a 
sufficient title, unless such further words indicate a subJect 
not really related to the matters covered by the body of a bill. 
(Estate of Elliott, supra.) 
The trial court properly concluded that under section 402 
of the Vehicle Code the negligence of a borrower of a car 
should be imputed to the owner in an action by the owner 
against a third party. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J., Carter, J., 
and Traynor, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 17217. In Bank. Jan. 26, 1942.J 
DISTRICT BOND COMPANY (a Corporation), Plaintiff, 
v. FLORENCE POLLACK et al., Defendants; MAR-
CUS ZASLAW, Intervener and Respondent; E. W. 
JOHNSON, Appellant. 
[1] Streets-Improvement Act of 1911-Actions-Foreclosure-
E:ffect on Owner Not aParty.-Under the Street Improvement 
Act of 1911 (Stats. 1911, p. 730; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, 
Act 8199) a purchaser of property who is bound by an assess-
ment represented by a sewer bond is not divested of his title 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Street,s, § 415 (1); [3] Quieting 
. Title, § 48. 
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by a foreclosure proceeding or the commissioner's deed, where 
he was not made a party to the action and had no notice there-
of. The purchaser at the sale obtained the lien which con-
tinued to exist against the property. 
[2] Id.-Improvement Act of 1911-Actions-Foreclosure-Pur-
chaser's Rights-Subrogation to Tax Liens.-The purchaser at 
a sale to foreclose a sewer bond under the Street Improve-
ment Act of 1911 who pays the taxes on the prope,rty, not as a 
volunteer but to protect his interest therein is subrogated t() 
the tax liens and is properly adjudged to have a lien against 
the property for the full amount of his expenditures. 
[8] Quieting Title-Conditions to Relief-Payment of Taxes.-A 
person who seeks a decree quieting title against another who 
paid taxes assessed against the property, not as a volunteer, 
but to protect his interest therein, may be required as a con-
dition to relief to repay the amounts expended for such pur-
pose. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Thomas C. Gould, JUdge. Affirmed. 
Action to foreclose a street improvement bond in which 
the holder of a commissioner's deed issued pursuant to a 
prior proceeding to foreclose a sewer bond intervened, seek. 
ing a decree quieting his title against the defendant in inter. 
vention, a purchaser in possession of the land affected, who 
was not a party to the prior proceeding. Judgment quieting 
the title of the defendant in intervention, conditioned on pay-
ment of amounts expended in payment of the sewer bond and 
taxes, affirmed. 
R. L. Carlisle for Appell'ant. 
Paul Magasin and Charles H. Heustis for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J.-In 1935, appellant, defendant in interven. 
tion in the court below, purchased certain real property 
located in Burbank, California, and went into immediate pos. 
session. In 1936 an action was brought to foreclose a sewell 
bond outstanding against the property. Appellant was not 
made a party to this action and had no actual or constructive 
[2] See16 Cal. Jur; 349-351; 33 Am. Jur. 439 • 
[3] Se,e 22 Cal. Jur. 138. 
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notice thereof. A judgment of foreclosure was entered, pur-
suant to which a sale was held. The property was purchased 
at the foreclosure sale by Eva Zaik, and a commissioner's 
certificate of sale was issued to her. Eva Zaik assigned this 
certificate of sale to respondent, plaintiff in intervention in 
the court below, who secured a commissioner's deed to the 
property. Respondent paid Eva Zaik the amount bid at the 
foreclosure sale, paid delinquent taxes on the property, and 
costs. In the following year he paid the current taxes on the 
property. The various expenditures amounted to $656.81. 
In 1937 the District Bond Company filed an action to fore-
close a street improvement bond outstanding against the 
property. Respondent obtained leave to file a complaint in 
intervention, wherein he claimed to be the owner of the 
property by virtue of the deed obtained pursuant to the prior 
foreclosure proceeding, offered to pay the Bond Company's 
lien, and asked that his title be quieted as against appellant, 
who was named as defendant in intervention. Respondent's 
ownership of the property was denied by appellant, who 
asked in his answer that title be quieted in his favor against 
respondent. 
The trial court found that the sewer bond foreclosure pro-
ceeding was ineffective as to appellant because he had no 
notice thereof. It decreed that title to the property should 
be quieted in appellant's favor and that appellant pay to 
resp()udent the $656.81 expended by respondent in payment 
of tJ-..c sewer bond and the taxes against the property on con-
dition that respondent deed all his interest in the property 
to appellant, respondent to have a lien against the property 
for this amount. 
Appellant appeals from that part of the judgment order-
ing the payment to respondent of the sums expended by him 
and providing for a lien against the property. 
[1] The assessment represented by the sewer bond created 
a lien against the property binding upon all subsequent own-
ers until the bond was paid. (Street Improvement Act of 
1911, secs. 66, 75; 63; Stats. 1911, page 730; 2 Deering'S 
Gcneral Laws, 1937, Act 8199, secs. 66, 75, 63.) Appellant 
therefore acquired the property in question subject to the 
assessment lien already existing against it. The proceeding 
to foreclose this lien could not operate to divest appellant 
of his ownership because he was not made a party to the pro-
ceeding and received no notice thereof. (Lee v. Silva, 197 
Cal. 364 [240 Pac. 1015] ; Page v. W. W. Ohase 00., 145 Cal. 
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578 [79 Pac. 278] ; Noble v. Blanchard, 120 Cal. App. 664 
[8 Pac. (2d) 523].) ,The commissioner's certificate of sale 
and the commissioner's deed issued to respondent by virtue 
of the foreclosure sale were ineffective to pass to respondent 
full title to the property. Respondent, however, by his pur-
chase obtained the lien, which continued to exist against the 
property. (Burns v. Hiatt, 149 Cal. 617, 620 [87 Pac. 196, 
117 Am. St. Rep. 157] ; Tutt v. Van Voast, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 
282 [97 Pac. (2d) 869]; Warden v. Barnes, 111 Cal. App. 
287, 292 [295 Pac. 569] ; Chapman v. Rudolph, 58 Cal. App. 
233 [208 Pac. 370]; Street Improvement Act of 1911, sec. 
75, 2 Deering's General Laws, 1937, Act 8199, sec. 75.) The 
transaction amounted to a transfer to him of the assessment 
lien for value, and in no way prejudiced the rights of appel-
lant who continued to own the property subject to the lien. 
(Ibid.) 
[2] Respondent, acting not as a volunteer, but to protect 
his interest in the property, paid the taxes, past and current, 
and was thereby subrogated to the tax liens against the prop-
erty. (See cases cited in 16 Cal. Jur. 349-351, secs. 48, 49.) 
The trial court therefore properly adjudged respondent to 
have a lien against the property for the full amount of his 
expenditures. 
[3] Appellant contends that the relief afforded respon-
dent was outside the issues raised by the pleadings. Appel-
lant, however, in his answer affirmatively requested tho trial 
court to quiet title to the property in his favor. (Islais etc. 
Water 00. v. Allen, 132 Cal. 432 [64 Pac. 713] ; HouiJh v. 
Wright, 127 Cal. App. 689 [16 Pac. (2d) 301]; Brooks v. 
White, 22 Cal. App. 719 [136 Pac. 500] ; Bec;k v. Wilson, 49 
CaL App. 281 [193 Pac. 158] ; Green v. Palmer, 68 Cal. App. 
393 [229 Pac. 876].) A party who requests equitable relief 
must satisfy the equitable claims interposed by the opposing 
party. (Lanktree v. Lanktree, 6 Cal. (2d) 120 [56 Pac. (2d) 
943]; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal. App. 400, 406 [277 Pac. 
163] .) The trial court could not quiet appellant's title to the 
property without protecting the interests of respondent 
therein. (EUis v. Witmer, 134 Cal. 249, 253 [66 Pac. 301] ; 
Holland v. Hotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366 [123 Pac. 258, L. R. A. 
1915c, 492]; Warden v. Barnes, supraj Jeffords v. Young, 
supraj Sawyer v. Berkeley Securities Co., 99 Cal. App. 545 
[279 Pac. 217] ; Beck v. Wilson, 49 Cal. App. 281 [193 Pac. 
158] ; Colkins v. Doolittle, 45 Cal. App. 776, 780 [188 Pac. 
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601] ; Corda.no v. Kelsey, 28 Cal. App. 9, 22-24 [151 Pac. 391, 
398] ; Stege v. Richmond, 194 Cal. 305, 319 [228 Pac. 461], 
writ of error dismissed, 273 U. S. 648 [47 Sup. Ct. 245, 71 
L. Ed. 821] ; Marysville Woolen Mills v. Smith, 178 Cal. 786, 
792 [175 Pac. 13]; Hurt v. Pico. Investment Co., 127 Cal. 
App. 106, 113 [15 Pac. (2d) 203].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, 
J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
[Sac. No. 5497. In Bank. Jan. 26, 1942.] 
BERT SPARKS, Respondent, v. PAUL ANKER BERNT-
SEN et al., Appellants. 
[Sac. No. 5498. In Bank. Jan. 26, 1942.] 
JAMES L. JOHNSON, a Minor, etc., Respondent, v. PAUL 
ANKER BERNTSEN et al., Appellants. 
[Sac. No. 5499. In Bank. Jan. 26, 1942.] 
BERNARD A. COKER, a Minor, etc., Respondent, v. PAUL 
ANKER BERNTSEN et al., Appellants. 
[1] Automobiles-Operation-Persons Liable-Lender-Nature of 
Liability.-Under Veh. Code, § 402, relating to the liability of 
private owners of automobiles operated by others, the owner 
is primarily and directly liable jointly with the driver, and 
the owner's liability is the same as the driver's unless the ver-
dict or judgment is in excess of the prescribed amount. 
[IJ Statutes making owner liable for injury or damage by an-
other operating automobile, notes, 61 A. L. R. 846, 851, 855, 859, 
866; 62 A. L. R. 1163. See, also, 2 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 484; 
5 Am. Jur. 697. 
Liability of owner for negligence of one to whom car is loaned, 
notes, 36 A. L. R. 1137; 68 A. L. R. 1008 ;100 A. L. R. 920. 
McK. Dig. References: [IJ Automobiles, § 167 (3); [2, 3] Auto-
mobiles, § 358; [4, 5] Trial, § 227. 
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[2&, 2b] Id.-Actions-Findings, etc.-Verdict-Against Lender 
and Operator.-In an action for damages brought against the 
owner and the operator of a borrowed automobile,a verdict 
for the plaintiff and against the defendants for an amount in 
excess of the amount specified in Veh. Code, § 402, is proper 
and sufficient. ·Any further provision purporting to apportion 
the total damages· as between the defendants is mere ~'mrplus~ 
age, since the limitation of liability of the owner follows as a 
matter of law, and cannot be changed by the jury. In such 
eases, it is proper for the court, where the award exceeds th~ 
amount specified in the code section to render judgment fo1' 
the plaintiff in the total amount limiting the recovery against 
the owner to the statutory sum, or, where the verdict is for a 
less amount, to render judgments against both defendants in 
the sum specified in the verdict. 
[3] Id.-Actions-Findings, etc.-Verdict - Against Lender and 
Operator-Apportioning Damages.~In an action against an 
owner and the operator of a borrowed automobile, a verdict 
assessing damages at a specified amount against the driver 
and a less amount against the owner is erroneous. (See Veh. 
Code, § 402.) 
[4] Trial-Verdict-Amendment ·by Jury-After Polling the Jury. 
-Code Civ. Proc., §§ 618, 619, should be read together. The 
polling of the jury does not preclude the court from exercis-
ing its powers under § 619 to correct an incorrect or insuffi-
cient verdict. The trial court retains control over such pro-
ceedings with power to procure correction of an informal or 
insufficient verdict until the verdict is recorded and the jury 
finally discharged. 
[5] Id.-Verdict-Amendment by Jury-Duty ofCourt.-Where 
a verdict returned is incorrect or insufficient, it is the duty of 
the trial court on objection of a party to refer the verdict 
back to the jury. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Placer 
County. Raymond McIntosh, Judge assigned. Affirmed. 
Consolidated actions for damages arising out of an automo-
. bile accident brought against both the owner and the operator, 
Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed. 
Hoge, Pelton & Gunther and Butler, Van Dyke & Harris for 
Appellants. 
Nathan Goldwater, Leo Murcell, Orrin J. Lowell, Lowell & 
Lowell,Henry & Bedeau and Grover W. Bedeau for Respon-
dents. 
